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Climate change litigation as a means to address intergenerational 
equity and climate change 
*Danai Spentzou 
Abstract Over the years human activities have increased the emissions of greenhouse gases 
resulting in changes in the global climate. Most of the consequences of these changes will be 
seen in the years to come. Climate change does not only challenge the survival of subsequent 
generations but also has implications for intergenerational justice. Taking into consideration 
that the well-being of future generations rely upon the actions of present generations, the 
question of whether the former have rights over the latter is major. The theory of 
intergenerational equity addresses this issue. For years, the notion of intergenerational equity 
has had an ethical dimension, but recent litigation gave it bones and structure. This article 
connects established theories of intergenerational justice to the recent climate cases. By 
analysing significant national, regional, and international case law, this article examines 
whether climate change litigation can promote intergenerational equity and combat climate 
change itself. No absolute answer is provided, as this article accepts its limitations and 
criticism, particularly regarding the barriers in litigation against private corporations. 
However, in light of recent events, the author of this article remains optimistic, as despite the 
lack of success in court, the adjudicated cases have positively contributed to the development 
and recognition of intergenerational rights in climate change law. 
1. Introduction 
The prevalence of food poverty, poor sanitation, preventable diseases, population migration, 
extreme weather conditions, scarcity of safe drinking water, and lack of adequate shelter 
confirm the statement that ‘climate change is the biggest global health threat in the 21st 
century’.1 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), human 
activity was a decisive factor for the changes in global climate.2 The use of fossil fuels, land 
 
* LL.M. in Human Rights Law, Queen Mary University of London, Distinction); This article is the result of hard 
work and inspiration that I would not have been able to achieve without the valuable guidance of my supervisor 
and professor Dr. Angeliki Papantoniou, Climate Change Law Course Convenor at QMUL. 
1 Costello A, Abbas M, Allen A, Ball S, Bellamy R, et al., ‘Managing the health effects of climate change’, (2009), 
Lancet and University College London Institute for Global Health Commission, 373:1693–733. 
2 IPCC, Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, Contribution of working group to the fourth assessment report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (2007), Cambridge University Press, p. 976. 
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use, and agricultural activities lead to an enormous increase in the concentration of greenhouse 
gases over the last 250 years.3  
Climate change will have a substantial effect on the health and survival of the next 
generations among ‘already challenged populations.’4 It challenges global equity and justice. 
Not all states are equally responsible for the changes in global climate, and whilst the highest 
percentage of gas emissions comes from industrialized countries, it is the less developed 
countries that will suffer the most.5 However, the inequality does not end there. As Edith 
Brown-Weiss states, ‘no longer can we ignore the fact that climate change is an 
intergenerational problem, and that the well-being of future generations depends upon actions 
we take today.’6 Climate change not only challenges justice between present and future 
generations but between different communities within future generations as well.7  
Intergenerational justice embodies the duties the present generation owes to future 
generations to preserve a natural environment capable of sustaining life and civilisation to at 
least the same quality of today. In intergenerational ethics these duties may include 
responsibilities related to older generations, like social security (where younger working 
populations secure financial and social benefits for the elderly) or reparations (where 
compensation to a deceased former generation for an injury done to it); and duties related to 
future generations (as the duty of the parents to care for their children), or with respect to 
climate change, the obligation the present generation has, not to cause pollution that will injure 
unborn future generations.8 
 Regarding intergenerational equity there is one fundamental question: what are the 
exact rights that future generations are entitled to, and are they moral or legal?9 There have 
been several ethical discussions related to intergenerational equity, but an ethical analysis is 
 
3 Ibid.  
4 Rylander C, Odland JO, Sandanger TM, ‘Climate change and the potential effects on maternal and pregnancy 
outcomes: an assessment of the most vulnerable the mother, fetus, and newborn child’, 6 (2013), Global Health 
Action, 19538 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3595418/.  
5 Frank Bierman and Ingrid Boas, ‘Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol’ (2008), 
Environment Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, Environment 50, p. 13; Henry Shue, ‘Climate 
Justice: Vulnerability and Protection’, (2014) Oxford University Press, p. 4, 205. 
6 E. Brown Weiss, ‘Climate change, intergenerational equity, and international law’, (2008), Vermont Journal of 
Environmental Law, 9(3), p. 616.  
7 Ibid, p. 619. 
8 Solum L.B., ‘To Our Children’s Children’s Children: The Problems of Intergenerational Ethics’, (2001/2002), 
35 Loyola Los Angeles Law Review 163, p. 173. 
9 Fitzmaurice Malgosia, ‘Contemporary Issues in International Environmental Law’, (2009), Edward Elgar 
Publishing, p. 120. 
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beyond the scope of this paper. Although the fundamental theories will be shortly presented, 
the focus will be on the search for the legal basis for the rights of future generations. In 
opposition to the obligations of the present generations towards the future generations, there is 
no explicit recognition of the rights of future generations in international environmental law, 
despite few exceptions that will be outlined in the following section. Thus, an important pool 
of legal content will be found in litigation.  
To examine whether climate change litigation can be an effective remedy in the fight 
against climate change, and to promote intergenerational equity, cases from international, 
regional and domestic courts will be evaluated. Considering that international climate change 
litigation faces several barriers and is not an effective tool in promoting intergenerational 
equity, the importance and relevance of domestic and regional climate litigation will be 
highlighted. Climate change litigation can be sorted into human rights litigation against 
governments and litigation against private corporations. By reviewing some landmark cases, it 
will be assessed whether litigation can be an effective means of adequately addressing climate 
change and intergenerational injustice. 
1.1. Historical background 
Deliberation over the fate of future generations and the impulse to preserve our planet 
in trust for those generations are not new notions. Intergenerational equity is part of the justice 
theory with roots in the distant past. One of the most influential theories on intergenerational 
justice was developed by John Rawls in 1971, which then stimulated the theory of E. Brown 
Weiss, that constitutes a fundamental theory in intergenerational ethics. 
Rawls’ theory was based on a thought experiment, occurring under a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
according to which rational people, standing in the original position, would decide the 
principles that would form existing inequalities.10 Rawls supported the idea that participants 
would settle for principles based on which inequalities would be acceptable only to the extent 
that ‘the least advantaged enjoyed the greatest benefit,’ as any participant could be born into 
the less favourable group.11 
 
10 Rawls John, ‘A theory of justice’ (1971), Cambridge Mass., Revised Edition (1999), Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, p. 140. 
11 Peter Lawrence, ‘Justice for Future Generations’, (2014), Climate Change and International Law, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, p. 51. 
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Brown Weiss extends Rawls’ theory in a different direction. She suggests that if each 
generation did not know beforehand when it will be located in the spectrum of time, it would 
choose a principle whereby each generation would want to inherit the planet ‘in as good 
condition as it has been for any previous generation and to have as good access to it as previous 
generations’.12 What is noteworthy is that Brown Weiss specifically asks for an equality 
principle, noting that ‘the theory of intergenerational equity calls for a minimum level of 
equality among generations’.13 Therefore, exploitation of natural resources is permitted 
provided that natural and cultural diversity is conserved and future generations’ options are not 
restricted.14 For Professor Brown Weiss, intergenerational equity is connected with the theories 
of trust and partnership among past, present and future generations.15 Each generation keeps 
earth resources in trust for future generations, the latter being both the beneficiaries and the 
trustees holding natural resources for next generations. In their use of the planet, all generations 
are equal, and the partnership between them is a corollary to equality.16 Intergenerational equity 
is based on the principles of conservation of options, quality and access to the planet’s resources 
for future generations, which create the nexus of intergenerational rights and obligations that 
derive as moral obligations. These are then converted into legal rights and obligations existing 
among members of each generation and amid generations.17 
Although the theory of intergenerational equity appears to be widely accepted as the 
general norm,18it was subject to a degree of criticism. First, it was argued that because future 
generations will consist of individuals who do not currently exist, they cannot have any rights. 
Secondly, it was suggested that it would be irrational to presently interfere in actions that will 
affect future generations, as it is unknown what the consequences and subsequently the needs 
(for psychological or physical make-up) would be for these generations as a result of that 
interference.19 Additionally, the legal content of intergenerational equity was challenged, as 
equity by definition pursuits to ameliorate the effect of legal rules upon already existing legal 
 
12 E. Brown Weiss, ‘In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Law Patrimony and 
Intergenerational Equity’, (1989), p. 24. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, p. 41-42. 
15 Fitzmaurice, supra note 9, p. 123. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, p. 124. 
18 Burns H. Weston, ‘Climate Change and Intergenerational Justice: Foundational Reflections’, 9 VJEL, p. 
396. 
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obligations and rights of individuals; thus, according to some authors, future generations could 
not enforce their own rights, even if they had locus standi in international law.20 
The standing of future generations has long been the subject of legal dialogue. 
Questions concerning what should be distributed or preserved for future generations have 
flourished through academic literature.21 The possibility of representing future generations, 
who do not currently exist and  cannot express their interests or select representatives, has 
prompted notions of institutionalizing representatives for future generations (through a body 
representing future generations into the political system) and surrogate representation (which 
includes representatives that have not necessarily been elected by those who they represent).22 
Brown Weiss has noted that the standing of an individual is not important in forming the rights 
of future generations, as intergenerational equity is a group right.23 Rawls on the other hand 
focuses on how fair distribution should be estimated, arguing for a ‘fair share’ or ‘just saving’ 
question (that is, how much present generations should keep in the benefit of future 
generations), measurements of which may have different interpretations.24 
It is the author’s view that ambiguity relating to the standing of an individual should 
not prevent us from forming the rights and interests of future generations as the law often deals 
with future threats, even where there is no present severe threat.25 For instance, the safety of 
the foetus might prevail over the right of autonomy of the pregnant woman even though the 
foetus obtains legal status and rights only after it is born alive.26 One may argue that 
environmental harms to future generations differ because there is no present threat (severe or 
otherwise) but only a future one. However, rising temperatures, melting ice-glaciers and land 
loss as presented at the beginning of this article already pose great dangers to many populations. 
As the moral philosopher Henry Shue stated ‘we ought not to discount the seriousness of an 
outcome at all on the basis of its probability or uncertainty’ if it is very likely to happen and 
 
20 V. Lowe, ‘Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments’, in A. Boyle and D. Freestone, 
“International Law and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges” (1997), p. 27. 
21 Vrousalis Nicholas, ‘Intergenerational Justice’, in “Institutions for Future Generations” Iñigo González-
Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (eds.), (2016), Oxford University Press.  
22 Anja Karnein, ‘Can we Represent Future Generations?’ in “Institutions for Future Generations” Iñigo 
González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries (eds.), (2016), Oxford University Press. 
23 E. Brown Weiss, ‘Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment’, (1990), 84 AJIL p. 
204. 
24 Burns H. Weston, supra note 18, p. 409. 
25 Ibid, p. 402. 
26 Samantha Halliday, ‘Autonomy and pregnancy: a comparative analysis of compelled obstetric intervention’, 
in Sheila A.M. McLean (Ed.), (2016), Biomedical Law and Ethics Library, p. 5. 
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may cause losses extremely disproportionate to the costs of prevention.27 Failing to deal with 
climate change due to lack of standing would signify not only a failure to help future 
generations, but actively causing them harm.28 
Even if an ethical discussion is not within the scope of this paper, it is important to 
present the above stated theories for better understanding of the concept of intergenerational 
equity within a legal context. Besides, according to Brown Weiss, the theory of 
intergenerational equity finds its roots in general international law, at the United Nations (UN) 
Charter and the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).29 In general, 
apart from these two principal international agreements, multiple international environmental 
agreements, in addition to soft-law documents drafted years ago, incorporate, at least in the 
Preamble, a statement for future generations.30 Among them, the Stockholm Declaration on 
Human Environment and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development recognise the 
need to safeguard the ‘natural resources of the earth’ in order to ‘equitably meet developmental 
and environmental needs of present and future generations.’31 More recently, a strong provision 
on intergenerational equity is established in the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
and Radioactive Waste Management, which acknowledges the intergenerational implications 
of nuclear waste and requests that Parties avoid enforcing ‘undue burdens’ on future 
generations, including burdens that are greater than those imposed on the present generations.32 
However, certain environmental treaties may not always be enforceable when fighting 
for intergenerational equity, as they may generate principles, but not rules.33 Therefore, the 
impact of litigation is even greater as it can apply the principle of intergenerational equity in 
practice. The first case where this was successfully applied, though in conjunction with the 
 
27 Henry Shue, Climate, ‘A Companion to Environmental Philosophy’, in Dale Jamieson ed., (2001), p. 19.  
28 Ibid, p. 450. 
29 Brown Weiss, supra note12, p. 24; UN, Charter of the UN, 24 October 1945, 1-UNTS-XVI; UN General 
Assembly, UDHR, 10 December 1948, 217-A-(III). 
30 See, e.g., the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, (1946), 161 UNTS 72; the 1979 Bonn 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, (1979), 19 ILM (1980) 15; the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, (1973), 12 ILM 1085.  
31 Principle 2 of the Stockholm Declaration on Human Environment, 11 ILM (1972) 1416; Principle 3 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM (1992) 874. 
32 Article 1, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management, 36 ILM (1997), at 
1436. 
33 Boyle A, ‘Some Reflections on Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, in V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), 
Multilateral “Treaty-Making: The Current Status of Challenges to and Reforms Needed in the International 
Legislative Process”, (2000), p. 32. 
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right to a healthful environment, was the Minors Oposa claim in 1993.34 The plaintiffs were 
minors, representing themselves and unborn generations, and requested to cancel registered 
permits issued based on the Timber Licensing Agreements (TLAs), as well as to cease issuing 
new ones, as they permitted deforestation. They found legal ground on the right of balanced 
and healthful ecology, as established in the Constitution of the Philippines. The case was 
dismissed by the Court in first instance for a lack of standing among other reasons. However, 
the Supreme Court gave the petitioners locus standi and stated that:  
‘Each generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and 
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology […] The 
minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment, at the same time, 
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the 
generations to come.’35  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling was subject to criticism, as it did not cancel any 
TLAs, but only ordered the case to be remanded for trial with TLAs holders while the 
Philippine forests continued to be denuded.36 Although the Court’s statement recognised the 
intergenerational element through the constitutional right to a healthy environment as an obiter 
dictum, it presented no binding precedent.37 While the constitutions of numerous States 
incorporate provisions referring to future generations, the Minors Oposa case is one of the few 
existing examples where intergenerational justice and the constitutional right to a clean 
environment converged.38 
At the international level, the concept of intergenerational justice has been discussed with 
regards to long-lasting effects of nuclear power. In the Nuclear Test II case,39 Judge 
Weeramantry, in an effort to recognize the rights of future generations and the obligations of 
 
34 Minors Oposa v Secretary of The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Supreme Court 
of the Philippines, [1993], 33 ILM (1994), at 173. 
35 Ibid, at 185. 
36 A. de la Viña, ‘The Right to a Sound Environment: The Case of Minors Oposa v Secretary of Environment and 
Natural Resources’, (1994/IV), 3 RECIEL p. 459-460. 
37 Fitzmaurice, supra note 9, p. 140. 
38 Ibid, p. 148-150. 
39 Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) Case, Order of 22 September 1995 (Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Weeramantry) [1995] ICJ Rep. 317, at 317–62.  
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the States to protect them, stated that considering the long-term consequences of nuclear 
testing,  
‘this Court must regard itself as a trustee of those rights in the sense that a 
domestic court is a trustee of the interests of an infant unable to speak for itself 
[...] New Zealand’s complaint that its rights are affected does not relate only 
to the rights of people presently in existence […] [but also] include[s] the 
rights of unborn posterity […] rights which a nation is entitled, and indeed 
obliged, to protect.’40  
Further, it is worth mentioning the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,41 where the 
Court noted that ‘Ionising radiation has the potential to damage the future environment, food 
marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic effects and illnesses to future generations.’ This 
showed that in shaping its opinion, the Court would weigh the possible damage caused by 
nuclear weapons not only to generations afterwards but to ‘all civilisation and the entire 
ecosystem of the planet.’42 Regrettably, the Court did not explicitly rely on the principle of 
intergenerational equity, nor did it explicitly recognise the rights of future generations.43 Thus, 
issues related to the legal position of future generations remained unresolved. 
Litigation shows that throughout the years, mankind has interfered with nature without 
considering the consequences upon the environment.44 Gradually, new scientific insights 
increased the awareness of the potential risks for present and future generations.45 However, as 
demonstrated, it is not enough to only recognise the risks or interests of future generations. 
There is a need to give a respectable legal context to their rights and obligations towards them, 
especially when taking into consideration the enormous impact that climate change will have 
on generations to come. As the following section will try to show, climate change litigation 
creates the necessary path towards successfully achieving that goal. 
1.2. Litigation 
 
40 Ibid, at 341. 
41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, 144-5, 177. 
42 Ibid, paras 29, 55. 
43 E. Brown Weiss, ‘Opening Doors to the Environment and to Future Generations’, in L. de Chauzournes and P. 
Sands (eds), “International Law, International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons” (1999), p. 349–50.  
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Although intergenerational equity made its first appearance as a theory in the world of 
ethics, nowadays it has practical impacts as evidenced by multiple case law, and plays an 
important role in climate change litigation. Over the last years, climate change litigation has 
vigorously increased in many countries around the world.46However, because climate change 
has multiple causes and effects, there is no universally accepted scope of climate change 
litigation. Climate change litigation therefore must have a climate change argument which ‘is 
explicitly presented as part of the claimant’s or defendant’s case’.47 The cases that are 
examined, hence include a climate change argument in relation to the rights of future 
generations or the obligations towards them. 
2. International litigation 
Apart from cases related to nuclear power, as aforementioned, climate change litigation 
before international courts, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), is extremely limited, and has a relatively small 
impact in comparison to the remarkable public attention disputes before these courts gather.48 
The relatively modest size of international climate change litigation is due to the fact 
that climate change is the consequence of a number of factors and its effect is transboundary.  
As the jurisdiction of cases before the ICJ is based on the concept of consent, all States involved 
should have given their consent to stand before the Courts.49 Accordingly, without any form of 
consent, disputes among States before the ICJ or ITLOS are hindered. Hence, the biggest 
obstacles towards international climate change litigation could be primarily political rather than 
legal.50 
One case in which the ICJ was found to lack jurisdiction was that of Obligations 
Concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament, in 2016.51 In that case, the Republic of the Marshall Islands filed applications 
 
46 Setzer Joana and Byrnes Rebecca, ‘Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot’, (2019), 
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics 
and Policy, London School of Economics, p. 3. 
47 Hilson Chris, ‘Climate Change Litigation in the UK: An Explanatory Approach (or Bringing Grievance Back)’ 
in Fracchia and Occhiena (editors), “Climate Change: La Riposta del Diritto”, Editoriale Scientifica (2010), p. 
422. 
48 Benoit Mayer, ‘The International Law on Climate Change’, (CUP 2018), p. 238. 
49 Article 36 paras (1), (2) United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946. 
50 Mayer, supra  note 48, p. 240.  
51 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, (2016), ICJ Rep 255. 
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against nine States, alleging violations of their obligations with respect to the early termination 
of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Though all nine applications were related 
to the same subject, the Marshall Islands distinguished between those States which had 
recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in accordance with Article 36 (2) of its 
Statute, and the others, whose consent was yet to be given. After examining the statements in 
each of the cases, ICJ concluded they did not provide ground for dispute before the Court, and 
thus it did not have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36 (2) to proceed to the merits of each of 
these cases.52  
3. Regional & domestic litigation against governments 
In contrast with international litigation, litigation deriving from regional or national 
courts plays an important role in combating climate change and promoting intergenerational 
equity. The subsequent climate change cases involve human rights claims and will be 
categorized in litigation addressing mitigation of climate change and litigation addressing 
adaptation and enforceability of existing goals. Further, cases addressing sustainable 
development and environmental impact assessment will be analysed to examine their 
contribution in ensuring intergenerational equity. Finally, litigation targeting the loss of 
biodiversity induced by climate change,  which threatens the rights of smaller communities or 
indigenous people, will be considered. 
3.1. Climate change litigation addressing mitigation  
It can be argued that all climate change cases addressing mitigation support 
intergenerational equity as their aim is to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, lower levels 
of pollution and consequently protect the environment and preserve natural resources for future 
generations. 
One ground-breaking climate case that obliged a government to urgently change its 
regulations and significantly reduce its emissions in keeping with its human rights obligations 
was the Urgenda case.53 In this case, the claimants – Urgenda Foundation and a group of 
almost 900 citizens- argued that the Dutch policy regarding the reduction of GHG emission 
was not in compliance with the State’s international legal obligations and compelled the latter 
 
52 Ibid. 
53 Urgenda Foundation v The Netherlands, [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689 (24 June 2015); appeal decision 
October 2018 and decision of Supreme Court, 19/00135, 20 December 2019. 
163 
 
© 2021 The Authors. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. 
to reduce its emissions. The claimants argued that if the Dutch government did not impose 
further reductions on GHG emissions, it would violate Articles 2 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, and the general duty of 
care in the Dutch civil code.54 The District Court decided that the Dutch government breached 
its duty of care, which compels parties to take precautionary measures to mitigate a threatening 
situation, and ruled that the Dutch emissions in the year 2020 need to be at least 25% lower 
than those in 1990.55 The State’s case that the Court’s ruling infringed the principle of the 
balance of powers was overruled by the Court of Appeal in 2018,56 concluding that, in 
compliance to Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR, the State was obliged to achieve a reduction of 
25%, due to the risks of hazardous climate change that could have a serious impact on the lives 
and wellbeing of the citizens. Following this judgment, the Dutch government appealed to the 
Supreme Court, where the previous decision was upheld. The Court confirmed that the 
reduction of GHG emissions is crucial to limit global warming to 1.5oC and to avoid the risk 
of irreversible changes to the ecosystems that would ‘jeopardise the lives, welfare and living 
environment of many people all over the world, including in the Netherlands’.57 
Urgenda underlined the political and social impact of climate change in the Netherlands 
and altered domestic climate change policy. To underline this decision’s significance not only 
at a national but moreover at an international level, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR), M. Bachelet, commented that ‘the decision confirms that the 
Government of the Netherlands and, by implication other governments, have binding legal 
obligations, based on international human rights law, to undertake strong reductions in 
emissions of greenhouse gases.’ She continued noting that this decision should be a paradigm 
not only for low-lying countries but worldwide.58 Urgenda demonstrated to Governments 
everywhere the need to take more ambitious climate action to protect human rights from the 
 
54 Ibid paras 4.35, 5.2-5.5. 
55 Ibid paras 4.54, 5.1. 
56 Setzer and Byrnes, supra note 46, at 6. 
57 Urgenda, supra note 53, Supreme Court’s decision, paras 4.1-4.8. 
58 UN Office of the High Commissioner, OHCHR’s Work On Human Rights And Climate Change, ‘Bachelet 
welcomes top court’s landmark decision to protect human rights from climate change’ 
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unfavorable effects of climate change.59 It stimulated climate cases worldwide and based on its 
outcome similar claims followed.60 
One of the cases where claims were based on the Urgenda judgment was the case of 
Plan B Earth and Others v Secretary of State and Business, Energy and Industry Strategy.61 
The action was brought by a British charity (Plan B Earth) and eleven individuals (aged 9 to 
79) alleging that the Secretary of State violated the Climate Change Act 2008 by failing to 
revise its new 2050 carbon emissions reduction target in line with the Paris Agreement and 
latest scientific developments. Citing the District Court’s decision in Urgenda, the plaintiffs 
argued that the State, when indicating measures for combating climate change, will have to 
consider that the costs of climate change ‘are to be distributed reasonably between the current 
and future generations’.62 The claimants emphasised the adverse impact of climate change that 
will affect different aspects of their lives. These included possible loss of life, severe health 
issues, property damage and personal decisions regarding their future, such as the commitment 
to have children taking into account the impending risks of climate change.63 The High Court 
denied the application for judicial review and supported the State’s case that the 2008 Act 
grants discretionary power and not an obligation to the Secretary of State, hence the latter did 
not breach any national or international obligation. The Appellate Court upheld that decision 
and did not find any error in the law regarding the alleged failure to exercise discretion to 
amend the 2050 target. Despite being unsuccessful, the case proves that the Urgenda judgment 
created a litigation precedent,64 which can be a useful tool for transforming mitigation policies 
towards net-zero carbon emissions and thus securing the rights of the current and future 
generations. 
The Urgenda precedent was further established by the case of VZW Klimaatzaak v 
Kingdom of Belgium and Others,65 where a non-profit organisation requested that the Belgian 
government should aim to reduce GHG emissions by 40% lower than 1990 levels by 2020 and 
87.5% lower by 2050. Up to the present moment, the court has ruled on procedural matters 
 
59 Cox Roger, ‘A Climate Change Litigation Precedent: Urgenda Foundation v the State of the Netherlands’, 
(2016) 34 J.E.R.L, 143 (144). 
60 See Union of Swiss Senior Women for Climate Protection v Swiss Federal Council and Others, [2016]; VZW 
Klimaatzaak v Kingdom of Belgium & Others, [2014] [pending].  
61 Plan B Earth and Others v Secretary of State and Business, Energy and Industry Strategy, [2018]CO/16/2018. 
62 Ibid, para 146, reference at Urgenda supra note 53, para 4.76. 
63 Ibid, paras 18, 206. 
64 Ibid, paras 144,146; Cox, supra note 59. 
65 See cases supra note 60.  
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brought in by the Flemish region, which the regional government has appealed. The appeal was 
rejected in April 2018. Although the final judgement is pending, the Klimaatzaak case is 
important to demonstrate the impact that Urgenda has in recent climate litigation. 
The outlined cases illustrate how litigation can be an effective tool towards fighting 
climate change and promoting intergenerational justice. They represent only a small selection 
of numerous cases pertaining to mitigation and confirm that such litigation has grown into a 
critical part of the climate change dialogue.66 However, as the following cases will show, 
climate change litigation can not only be used as a remedy to address mitigation, but also 
adaptation and the enforcement of existing goals. 
3.2. Litigation addressing climate change adaptation 
Article 7 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
sets a frame of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ for States. Following the mitigation 
of GHG emissions, these responsibilities are completed with the support for national methods 
that counteract existing or forthcoming climate change harms (‘adaptation’), incorporating 
social security, management of natural resources, and enforceability of existing goals and 
policy measures.67 Therefore, subsequent to the litigation of climate change mitigation, 
litigation related to climate change adaptation is the second most important tool to combat 
climate change and ensure intergenerational equity. 
Lately, due to the strong impact climate change has on displacement, climate adaptation 
litigation regarding “climate refugees” has increased.68 Annually, about 25 million people are 
being displaced, internally or across international borders.69 The high-profile case of Mr. 
Teitiota will help analyse the importance of adaptation litigation.70 Mr. Teitiota, a national of 
the Republic of Kiribati, unsuccessfully applied for international protection under the refugee 
status in New Zealand ‘on the basis of changes to his environment in Kiribati caused by sea-
level-rise associated with climate change’.71 Specifically, he argued that sea-level rise led to 
 
66 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?’ (2018), 7-TEL-37, p. 106.  
67 Article 7 UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, S.-Treaty-Doc-No. 102-38, 1771-UNTS-107. 
68 Mayer, supra note 48, p. 247. 
69 United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security, ‘Climate Change, Migration and 
International Justice’ (2018), https://ehs.unu.edu/media/press-releases/climate-change-migration-and- 
international-justice.html. 
70 Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107; AF 
(Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413. 
71 Ibid, AF (Kiribati), at 2. 
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contamination of fresh potable water and gradually land disputes. The Immigration Tribunal 
rejected his application noting that persecution under refugee law requests the implication of 
‘some form of human agency’.72 While the Supreme Court upheld that decision, it also 
specified that it should not be interpreted in a way that ‘environmental degradation resulting 
from climate change [...] could never create a pathway into the Refugee Convention’.73 This 
last statement, which was also supported by the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), can 
be an important step towards the recognition of “climate refugees” under international refugee 
law protection. 
In January 2020, the UNHRC published its views on that case.74 The key issue to decide 
in this case was whether New Zealand had erroneously or arbitrarily evaluated the alleged 
complaint on the applicant’s violation of the right to life with his return to the country of 
origin.75 The Committee, despite the strongly justified opposing opinions of two individuals,76 
concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated with sufficient evidence a clear arbitrariness 
or error in the domestic authorities’ evaluation of a particular, existing or foreseeable risk of 
threat to life that violated his rights under article 6 of the Covenant.77 Moreover, the Committee 
noted that even though there is a likelihood for the Republic of Kiribati to be rendered 
uninhabitable due to rising sea levels, there will be a timeframe of 10 to 15 years before that 
occurs, which would provide enough time “for intervening acts and affirmative measures” by 
the State and the international community to protect and, if necessary, relocate individuals.78 
This argument is rather disappointing considering that the contamination of water supply due 
to the environmental degradation is real and already negatively impacts the applicant’s family 
health and economic situation, posing a foreseeable risk of a threat to their lives.79 Waiting for 
more catastrophic events to meet a higher threshold of risk would be contradictory to the 
protection of life itself. 
 
72 Ibid, para 55.  
73 Teitiota, supra note 70, para 13. 
74 UNHRC, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning 
communication No. 2728/2016**, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, (7 January 2020), 
UNHRCViewsCCPR/C/127/D/27/28/2016.   
75 Ibid, para 8.5. 
76 Ibid, Annex 1, Individual opinion of Committee member Vasilka Sancin (dissenting), and Annex 2, Individual 
opinion of Committee member Duncan Laki Muhumuza(dissenting). 
77 Ibid, paras 9.13-9.14; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966. 
78 Ibid, para 9.12. 
79 Ibid, Annex 2, Duncan Laki Muhumuza, paras 1, 2.  
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However, although the Committee had reached the same conclusion with the Judicial 
Authorities, it made some very progressive comments, which could affect forthcoming 
judgements. In paragraph 9.3, the Committee noted that the non-refoulement obligation 
pursuant to article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) may 
be broader than the scope of the principle under international refugee law, as it might further 
involve the protection of foreigners not entitled to the refugee status.80 This gives ground to 
include more individuals suffering from climate change consequences. Moreover, as all 
relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account,81 the right to life shall not be 
understood in a restrictive manner. According to the Committee, safeguarding that right obliges 
States to take positive actions.82 Without ‘robust national and international efforts,’ the impact 
of climate change may threaten individuals’ right to life and give rise to ‘non-
refoulement obligations’ of States in the future.83 It is also the Committee’s position that 
environmental degradation, unsustainable development and climate change present very 
serious threats to the ability of both the current and the future generations to enjoy the right to 
life.84  These comments are highly significant and direct the path that a subsequent Court ruling 
may follow. 
The case of Mr. Teitiota is one of numerous cases that address climate-induced 
migration. Even though that case was unsuccessful, it introduced significant arguments and 
created a pathway into protection from environmental degradation under the refugee law. It 
indicates that firstly, there is no universal definition of “climate refugees” and that secondly, 
those that are dislocated do not meet any definition in any international protection regime.85 
This will not change unless a broader scope of refugee status protection is accepted. The case 
gathered considerable media attention and the Court’s ruling of environmental degradation 
possibly leading to refugee law protection can be used as a means to integrate migration into 
adaptation strategies.86 
 
80 UNHRC General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the Covenant on the right to life (CCPR/C/GC/36), 
para 31. 
81 See, inter alia, X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para 5.18, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/1833-
2008.html. 
82 UNHRC Views, supra note 74, para 9.4. 
83 Ibid, para 9.11. 
84 General Comment No. 36, supra note 80, para 62. 
85 Lauren Nishimura, ‘“ClimateoChangeoMigrants”:ImpedimentsotooaoProtectionoFrameworkoandotheoNeed 
tooIncorporateoMigration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies’ (2015), 27 Int'l J Refugee L, 107, p. 114. 
86 Ibid, p. 129. 
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Climate adaptation litigation can also be used to enforce presented targets.87 A 
significant case, used as a tool to enforce existing goals in addition to strengthening the link 
between climate change and human rights, is the case of Future Generations v Ministry of the 
Environment and Others.88 The plaintiffs, twenty-five children and youth, along with the non-
governmental organization “Dejusticia” sued the President of Colombia, the Ministry of 
Environment and Sustainable Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, all municipalities in the Colombian Amazon and a number of corporations. They 
brought the suit to enforce their rights to life, health, food, water and a healthy environment 
and to combat deforestation in the Colombian Amazon rainforest. The plaintiffs claimed that 
climate change in addition to the government's failure to cut down deforestation and comply 
with the net-zero deforestation target by the year 2020, pursuant to the Paris Agreement and 
the National Development Plan 2014-2018, jeopardizes the aforementioned fundamental 
rights. Hence, they filed a specific constitutional claim (“tutela”) to enforce their rights. 
The Lower Court’s ruling was not in favour of the plaintiffs. An appeal was filed on 16 
February 2018. On 5 April 2018, the Supreme Court reversed the Lower Court’s judgment, 
underlining the need for protection of fundamental rights and found the Colombian government 
accountable for undue deforestation and GHG emissions. The Court, acknowledging that the 
‘fundamental rights of life, health, the minimum subsistence, freedom, and human dignity are 
substantially linked and determined by the environment and the ecosystem’,89 reinforced the 
link between human rights and the environment. Additionally, what is of utmost importance is 
that the Court made a specific reference on the rights of future generations noting that ‘the 
increasing deterioration of the environment is a serious attack on current and future life and on 
other fundamental rights.’90 It further acknowledged the Colombian Amazon as a ‘subject of 
rights’ similar to the Constitutional Court’s recognition of the Atrato River.91 Accordingly, the 
Colombian Amazon was entitled to protection, maintenance, conservation, and restoration. 
 
87 Setzer and Byrnes, supra note 46, p. 7. 
88 Demanda Generaciones Futuras v Minambiente, N.: 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01, Tribunal Superior de 
Bogotá (12 febrero 2018) [Lower Court],  Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Bogotá (16 febrero 2018) 
[Appellate Court], Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casacion Civil, Republica de Colombia, Bogotá, D.C. (Avril 
4th, 2018); English translation: Future Generations v Ministry of the Environment and Others, Supreme Court 
decision, STC-4360-2018 (April 4th, 2018). 
89 Ibid, Future Generations, Supreme Court decision, STC-4360-2018, p. 13. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, p. 45. 
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Hence, the government was ordered to prepare and implement action plans to address 
deforestation in the Amazon rainforest.92 
The Colombian government failed to fulfil the imposed obligations as the deforestation 
was continued at the same rate, and thus the plaintiffs sought a declaration at the beginning of 
2019.93 Nevertheless, the contribution of that case to the fight for intergenerational equity is 
extremely important, as it did not only interpret the obligations of the Colombian government 
under the Paris Agreement but also the obligations towards future generations. It innovatively 
clarified that the protection of fundamental rights incorporates the unborn and set the basis of 
environmental rights of future generations on the ‘ethical duty of solidarity of the species’ and 
‘the intrinsic value of nature’. 94 Therefore, it established a direct link between the right to a 
healthy and sustainable environment and the rights of future generations, the former offering a 
solid legal context and reasoning for the latter. 
Addressing climate change is problematic as its impact is enormous and can affect 
every aspect of human society. Thus, climate change litigation can sometimes address both 
mitigation and adaptation measures. Such is the case of Juliana v United States; 95 a land-mark 
case that addresses both climate change mitigation and adaptation and promotes 
intergenerational equity. The plaintiffs are twenty-one individuals, aged 10 to 19, along with 
two nonprofit organisations “Earth Guardian” and “Future Generations.” The plaintiffs claimed 
that the US government had violated their constitutional rights to physical and mental health, 
life, liberty, and property, involving an asserted right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to a ‘climate system capable of sustaining human life’.96 They accused the US 
government of continuing to ‘permit, authorize, and subsidize’ fossil fuel use, disregarding  its 
risks and thus causing severe climate change-related harms to the plaintiffs.97 By failing to 
reduce GHG emissions the Government infringed a public trust obligation to preserve natural 
 
92 Ibid, p. 45, para 14. 
93 Setzer and Byrnes, supra note 46, p. 7. 
94 Future Generations, Supreme Court decision, STC-4360-2018, supra note 88, p. 18. 
95 Juliana v The United States of America, [filed on 2015], D.C. No. 6:15-cv-01517- AA, Court of Appeal, No. 
18-36082, 9th Circuit, [pending]. 
96 Juliana, Case:18-36082, 01/17/2020, ID:11565804, DktEntry:153-1, p. 11. 
97 Ibid, p. 12. 
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resources.98 The Government repeatedly sought to dismiss the case by contesting the standing 
of the plaintiffs.99 
The District Court rejected the Government’s motion to dismiss the case, confirming 
that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, and stated a claim for infringement of the Fifth 
Amendment due process right, which the Court identified  as to be free from devastating 
climate change that ‘will cause human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result in widespread 
damage to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s 
ecosystem.’100 Though the court rejected the State’s case regarding the lack of constitutional 
standing, the case is still pending due to procedural measures.101 If the plaintiffs succeed, 
Juliana will oblige the US government to introduce a decarbonization policy and apply 
extensive changes in the US energy system.102 Despite its status as pending, the case has 
already inspired other similar cases in different countries,103 some of which are still pending.104  
Furthermore, the case boosts the government to amend its mitigation policy similar to the 
Urgenda case. Even if Juliana is not successful, it will still constitute a landmark lawsuit of 
enormous public attention that will enhance the fight against climate change and secure 
intergenerational equity.105 Accepting that the plaintiffs have standing before the Court is an 
important step towards resolving the uncertainty of the legal standing of future generations that 
the aforementioned theories have presented, thereby addressing the biggest obstacle in 
intergenerational justice. 
The cases analysed above demonstrate that climate change litigation constitutes a robust 
regulatory tool in addressing climate change and safeguarding human rights.106 Climate change 
cases relating to mitigation can alter climate regulations, introduce new planning instruments 
and amend legislations. Mitigation is the first step towards maintaining a climate system 
‘capable of sustaining life’, as stated in Juliana, and reducing climate change impact to fairly 
distribute its cost between the present and future generations, as stated in Urgenda and Plan B 
 
98 Peel and Osofsky, supra note 66, p. 55. 
99 Juliana, supra note 95, at 1248; Powers Melissa, ‘Juliana v United States: The Next Frontier in US Climate 
Mitigation?’, (2018), 27 RECIEL, 199, p. 200. 
100 Juliana, Case 6:15-cv-01517-TC, Document 83, 11/10/16, p. 33. 
101 Powers, supra note 99, p. 200. 
102 Ibid, p.199. 
103 See above Future Generations v The Ministry of the Environment and Others; Aji P. et al v State of Washington 
et al, Case N.:96316-9, (2018). 
104 Reynolds v Florida, Case N.:2018-CA-819, (2018), [pending]. 
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Earth. However, mitigation without adaptation cannot produce the anticipated outcome, as 
multiple cases illustrate that  although States are obliged to act in compliance with their 
international obligations, they are reluctant to do so. Adaptation is necessary to address climate-
induced migration and respect the rights of forcibly displaced persons such as Mr. Teitiota, or 
to protect the environment and the substantial rights of the unborn and future generations, as 
stated in Future Generations. 
These cases reflect the multiple ways in which litigation can influence climate change 
policy making. Addressing the challenges that climate change presents, being a ‘dual 
regulatory problem,’ entails the creation of a uniform climate policy of a multi-level frame 
policy-making adaptation and interconnection between mitigation and adaptation measures.107 
Besides, climate change policy can only be effective when implemented through adaptation 
methods. The subsequent cases address climate change adaptation through the environmental 
impact assessment. 
3.3. Litigation concerning sustainable development and environmental impact 
assessment  
Climate change litigation in South Africa is significant, not only because Courts’ 
rulings enforce existing climate legislation, but more importantly they establish new goals 
through the interpretation of existing legislation asking for additional climate change 
considerations.108 The majority of those cases are related to regulatory challenges focusing on 
the authorisation of high-emitting projects, which is the result of an environmental impact 
assessment.109 One particular example is the case of Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and others,110 where the High Court determined that climate 
change is an important consideration when conducting the environmental review of a coal-fired 
power plant, called the “Thabametsi Project”. 
In that case, the claimant, Earthlife, a non-profit organisation appealed the 
environmental authorisation for the Thabametsi power project, which would be operating until 
at least 2061. The Minister of the Environment upheld the decision and then Earthlife requested 
 
107 Hari M. Osofsky, ‘The continuing importance of climate change litigation’ (2010), 1 Climate Law 3, p. 11-12.  
108 Setzer and Byrnes, supra note 46, p. 9.  
109 Ibid, p. 27. 
110 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and others, [2017], High Court of 
South Africa Gauteng Division, Pretoria, N.:65662/16. 
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to review both the decision granting the authorisation and the appeal decision of the Minister.111 
The Court was asked to consider whether the government had an obligation to conduct an 
assessment that would consider the potential environmental impacts to climate change, and 
whether climate change was a relevant consideration for environmental review under the 
Environmental Management Act 1998. The Court concluded that such considerations are 
relevant as, among other reasons, they are in line with South Africa’s obligations under  the 
Paris Agreement.112 Thus, in their absence from the project’s environmental review, the granted 
authorisation was unlawful. 
In justifying its conclusion, the Court referred to the constitutional right to have the 
environment protected ‘for the benefit of present and future generations, through […] measures 
that […] iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development’.113 It acknowledged the link between 
the environment and socio-economic considerations through the concept of sustainable 
development. The Court noted that ensuring the use of natural resources and ecologically 
sustainable development will protect the environment,114 especially when taking into 
consideration the substantial risk climate change poses to sustainable development in South 
Africa. This case significantly contributes to litigation supporting intergenerational equity by 
recognising that sustainable development is ‘integrally linked with the principle of 
intergenerational justice’ demanding States to protect the environment at present and for the 
future.115 Pursuant to section 233 of the Constitution, the government had to interpret the 
domestic legislation in accordance with international law, involving Paris Agreement and other 
internationally recognised treaties.116 Article 4 (1) (f) of the UNFCCC compels States parties 
to consider climate change impact in their relevant environmental policies and actions, and to 
employ suitable methods to minimise adverse effects on the environment and public health. 
The case of Earthlife Africa Johannesburg had a significant impact and subsequent 
cases referred to the Court’s judgement as a precedent for a climate change impact assessment 
for coal-fired power plants. One such case was GroundWork v Minister of Environmental 
 
111 Ibid, paras 1-2. 
112 Ibid, paras 90-91.  
113 Ibid, para 81, reference to section 24 of the South African Constitution. 
114 Ibid, para 82. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid, para 83. 
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Affairs and Others.117 The facts were similar to the Earthlife Africa Johannesburg case; the 
environmental organization GroundWork had filed a motion requesting a review of the 
authorisation to develop the "Khanyisa Project" -a 600 MW coal-fired power plant- that would 
consider the climate impacts of the plant. The Minister of Environmental Affairs' rejected 
GroundWork's application, which decision was then challenged by GroundWork. 
Both cases are important because they illustrate the climate change litigation trend in 
South African Courts. South Africa is a major contributor to global GHG emissions resulting 
from the high-amount of mining and minerals processing.118 Mitigation of those emissions is 
crucial as South Africa, along with other developing countries, is extremely vulnerable to the 
effects of climate change.119 Fortunately, as proven by the foregoing cases, the national Courts’ 
decisions respect the obligations under international environmental law and promote 
constitutional rights safeguarding the environment for the present and future generations. 
3.4. Litigation addressing specific groups (Indigenous people’s rights) 
Climate change will not affect all human populations to the same extent. The harmful 
impacts will be mostly felt by those populations that are already in vulnerable situations, 
particularly indigenous people or segments of population with minority status and 
disabilities.120 Indigenous people have a special relationship with their land and earth resources 
thus biodiversity loss induced by climate change will interfere with fundamental elements of 
their cultural identity, besides various other human rights.121 Intergenerational justice involves 
the preservation of the environment and allocation of its natural sources equally between 
generations. This however is not only limited to environmental rights but socio-economic rights 
as well.122 Therefore, protecting the environment is even more important in cases of local 
communities where their economy and cultural identity is exclusively based on the ecosystem. 
 
117 The Trustees for the time being of the GroundWork Trust v the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others, 
[2017], Petition before the High Court of South Africa, N.:61561/17. 
118 Ibid, para 34; Setzer and Byrnes, supra note 46, p. 9. 
119 GroundWork Trust, supra note 117, para 31. 
120 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 18/22 Human Rights and 
Climate Change, 17 October 2011, A/HRC/RES/18/22, available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/A.HRC.RES.18.22.pdf. 
121 Lenzerini Federico and Piergentili Erika, ‘A double-edged sword: climate change, biodiversity and human 
rights’, in Ottavio Quirico and Mouloud Boumghar (eds), “Climate Change and Human Rights: An international 
and comparative law perspective”, (2017), Routledge, p. 163.  
122 See cases Earthlife Africa Johannesburg, supra note 110; GroundWork Trust, supra note117, for the 
interrelationship between the environment and the social and sustainable development as aforementioned. 
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There is considerable litigation on indigenous people’s rights, which, albeit not always 
successful, has a great impact in the battle against climate change. Such litigation also 
illustrates the need for conservation of the environment and equal allocation of natural 
resources between present and future generations.  
The first case where relief was sought for human rights violations arising from global 
warming due to acts and omissions of the United States (US) - as one of the largest GHG 
emitters - was the Inuit Petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) in 2005.123 The petition, filed by an Inuk woman, Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference requested the Commission to endorse that the US adopt obligatory measures to 
limit its GHG emissions, and consider its impact on the Arctic when evaluating all main 
government actions. Moreover, the petition demanded the establishment and implementation 
of a plan that would protect Inuit culture and natural resources, in addition to providing the 
necessary support for Inuit people to adapt to the potential inevitable impacts of climate change. 
The petition was only successful in raising public awareness and was dismissed by the IACHR, 
because the petitioners were not able to provide sufficient evidence at the time to determine 
whether the alleged facts violated their fundamental human rights.124 The IACHR only allowed 
a special hearing. The petition specified how the impending impacts of climate change on 
harvesting wildlife resources were of major concern for the health, socio-economic well-being, 
and cultural survival of indigenous people throughout the Arctic.125 It gathered a lot of public 
attention and many cases followed with similar claims, proving that even unsuccessful 
litigation can have significant impact. 
Another noteworthy case is the petition filed before the IACHR, in 2013, seeking relief 
from human rights violations of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples due to global warming and ice-
glacier melting caused by black carbon emissions by Canada,126 which is still pending. 
 
123 Petition to The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief From Violations Resulting from 
Global Warming Caused By Acts and Omissions of the United States, (8 December 2005), petition denied on 16 
November 2006, http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-human-
rights-seeking-relief-from-violations-resulting-from-global-warming-caused-by-acts-and-omissions-of-the-
united-states/, [Inuit Petition].  
124 Bodansky Daniel, ‘Climate Governance beyond the United Nations Climate Regime’ in Bodansky, Brunnée 
and Rajamani, International Climate Change Law ( OUP 2017), p. 287. 
125 Inuit Petition, supra note 123, para 39. 
126 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations of the Rights of 
Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming and Melting Caused by Emissions of Black 
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According to the petition, Canada’s failure to effectively regulate black carbon emissions 
contributes to global warming and results in the violation of the Athabaskans’ rights to benefit 
from their culture, property, and preservation of health, as established by the American 
Declaration of Rights. Consequently, Canada allegedly violated the precautionary principle and 
its responsibility to avoid transboundary harm. The petition, filed by Earthjustice in the 
interests of the Arctic Athabaskan Council, requests on-site investigations and a hearing before 
the IACHR; a declaration by the Commission that Canada violates the American Declaration; 
and the establishment and implementation of a protection plan for the Athabaskan people.127 
Similar to the Inuit Petition, this case also confirms that cultural rights are of special importance 
to indigenous populations, as their cultural existence is usually a precondition for their physical 
survival.128 
On 28 January 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) issued its 
judgment in the case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname,129 a landmark case for 
indigenous peoples’ rights. This case was previously submitted to the IACHR collectively, by 
eight indigenous peoples’ communities, consisting of Kaliña and Lokono peoples of the Lower 
Marowijne River. The IACHR published its decision in July 2013 and, after Suriname’s non-
compliance with its advised remedial measures, communicated the case to the Court in January 
2014.130 In its ruling, the Court held Suriname accountable for violations of rights guaranteed 
under the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).131 The Court ordered guarantees 
of “non-repetition”, compelling that Suriname implements measures to recognise the rights of 
all indigenous and tribal peoples under its jurisdiction ‘so that similar acts are not repeated’.132 
The judgment constructively advances jurisprudence in some regards. In particular, its 
treatment of the rights of indigenous peoples regarding environmentally protected regions, and 
 




128 Lenzerini and Piergentili, supra 121, p. 164. 
129 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, [2015] IACtHR Series C, No. 309.  
130 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, [2013], IACHR, Case 12.639, Report No. 79/13, available at: 
www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/court/12639FondoEn.pdf. 
131 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, supra note 129, para 305. 
132 Ibid, paras 300, 305. 
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relevant international environmental law, is notable.133 Equally, the repeated citation of the 
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) strengthens its 
enforceability.134  This is significant as Articles 12 and 29(1) of the UNDRIP provide for the 
preservation of natural reserves so that indigenous people conserve their way of life, language 
and customs among others. It also guarantees their right to preserve the environment and 
protect the productive capacity of their lands. Thus, States are obliged to develop and apply 
assistance programmes to ensure those rights.135 It is worth mentioning that the remedies 
ordered by the Court present an unprecedented sensitivity towards indigenous peoples’ rights 
and an inclination to a favourable interpretation of the ACHR to protect those rights. For 
instance, the Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of considering the customs of the 
indigenous peoples when implementing the ACHR, which is common practice in similar 
cases.136 
On 16 January 2020, the Alaska Institute for Justice submitted a petition on behalf of 
five US Indian tribes from Louisiana and Alaska. Among others, the complaint was directed at 
the Special Rapporteurs on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, and the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. The petitioners argued that the US Government failed to protect them 
from forced displacement from their ancestral lands due to climate change.137 They claimed 
that the US Government's inaction has failed to protect and promote the right of self-
determination of the tribes throughout the adaptation strategies, involving relocation. 
Subsequently they asked for the U.S. Government to acknowledge the right to self-
determination and integral sovereignty of all the tribes, to grant federal recognition, to allocate 
funding to the named Louisiana tribes, to hold oil and gas corporations accountable for 
damages, and to preserve, among other things, the tribes' land and cultural heritage.138 The 
complaint also sought funding to implement the tribal-led resettlement process for Kivalina, 
 
133 Fergus MacKay JD, ‘The Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Convergence, Divergence and Mutual Reinforcement’, (2018), Erasmus Law 
Review, 1, p. 31-42.  
134 Ibid. 
135 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples, supra note 129, footnote 230, 231; Articles 12, 29(1), UN GA, UN Declaration-
on-the-Rights-of-Indigenous-Peoples: resolution/adopted by the GA, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. 
136 See Bamaca Velasquez v Guatemala, IACtHR (2000) Series C, No 70, para 81; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
v Nicaragua, Series C, No 79 (31 August 2001), para 149. 
137 Rights of Indigenous People in Addressing Climate-Forced Displacement, 15 January 2020, p. 3-9 
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/rights-of-indigenous-people-in-addressing-climate-forced-
displacement/.  
138 Ibid, 13-38. 
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while developing relocation institutional frameworks. Most of the claims stemmed from the 
UNDRIP, the Peninsula Principles on forcible displacement due to climate change, the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement,139 the Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution,140 and rights established in all principal international law instruments.141 
The aforementioned cases highlight that the land, for indigenous people, ‘is not merely 
a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element, which they must 
fully enjoy […] to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations’.142 
Climate change and related biodiversity loss of ancestral lands represent a particularly severe 
violation of indigenous people’s internationally recognised rights, which have a predominant 
cultural connotation.143 Indigenous peoples’ climate change litigation before the IACHR or the 
IACtHR has made a significant contribution to the fight for intergenerational equity as it 
increasingly affirms the right to a healthy environment as a human right that can be argued in 
court.144  
4. Litigation against private corporations 
Litigation against private corporations constitutes the last component of climate change 
litigation. Private corporations, and particularly the “Carbon Majors” that work in the energy 
sector, are responsible for almost up to 70 per cent of the global GHG emissions,145 and thus 
climate litigation targeting those companies has been increased lately.146 Such litigation usually 
aims to provide compensation to those most affected by climate change consequences and to 
hold the companies responsible for the costs of adaptation.147 The majority of these complaints 
are grounded in the common law tort of nuisance, however alternative grounds may involve 
trespass, negligence and only recently, human rights law.148 Nevertheless, as it will be 
demonstrated in this section, due to several obstacles, it is doubtful whether climate change 
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litigation against private corporations can be seen as an effective remedy to restore 
intergenerational justice in the fight against climate change. 
In fact, climate change cases against private corporations in relation to human rights 
are hard to find. Paradoxically, it is difficult to hold the main actors liable for human rights 
violations due to GHG emissions independently of States.149 On an international level, this is 
due to the lack of an efficient compulsory human rights framework dedicated to private 
corporations. On the contrary, States which have a duty to prevent infringements of human 
rights law, can be held responsible for harmful emissions by private corporations.150 
Consequently, a State is committed to adopting efficient laws and practices controlling actions 
and omissions not only by State actors but also by non-state agents, thus private corporations.151 
In Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria, the IACHR underlined that ‘governments have a duty to protect their citizens not only 
through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by protecting them from 
damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private companies’.152 Regarding climate change, 
the European Committee of Social Rights (ECteSR) in the Marangopoulos case - where the 
Greek energy policy on GHG-emitting lignite mines was found in violation of the right to 
health under the European Social Charter - reinforced the duty to prevent human rights 
violations.153 The aforementioned Inuit and Athabaskan petitions to the IACHR, are also 
focused on the State’s failure to prevent GHG emissions by private corporations in violation 
of numerous human rights.154 
On a national level, as evidenced by multiple cases, it is easier for private corporations 
to be held accountable for their emissions before domestic courts. In the case of Gbemre, a 
claim was filed before the Federal High Court of Nigeria against the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited, and 
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the Attorney General of the State of Nigeria.155 The Court ruled that gas flaring by these 
companies during their oil production activities, involving GHGs, infringed the fundamental 
rights to life and dignity as stated in Sections 33 and 34 of the Nigerian Constitution, entangled 
with the rights to health and environment of Articles 16 and 24 of the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (AChHPR).156 The State was also found accountable for not implementing 
adequate legislative measures to prevent oil pollution. Hence, despite the State’s responsibility, 
corporate responsibility for failing to respect human rights obligations was made possible in 
this case by the fact that emissions could be localized within the territory of the State and thus 
were easily attributable.157 As the next case will demonstrate, the transboundary impact of 
climate change is one of the biggest challenges for successful climate litigation against private 
corporations.  
In Native Village of Kivalina v ExxonMobil Corp,158 an Alaskan tribal village filed a 
lawsuit against twenty-four major companies in the oil and energy sector, arguing that they 
should be held liable for the impact climate change had on the former’s village and hence for 
adaptation costs. The common law tort of nuisance provided the legal ground for the request.159 
The District Court rejected their claim noting that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the 
‘political question doctrine’ prevented scrutiny of the nuisance claim.160 The village of Kivalina 
appealed that decision, but the Appellate Court also dismissed the case.161 Although 
unsuccessful, the case gained enormous public attention and raised awareness of climate 
change consequences within developed countries.162  
Although the Kivalina case showed that litigation against private corporations is faced 
with multiple barriers, it set an example for many similar cases, including the pending case of 
Lliuya v RWE, the so-called “Huaraz Case”.163 The Peruvian farmer and mountain guide Saúl 
Luciano Lliuya has filed, for the first time in Europe, a lawsuit against a company responsible 
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for climate change, the German utility RWE. Lliuya claims that RWE’s massive emissions 
threaten his family’s well-being, his property rights, as well as a large part of his home city of 
Huaraz. The court of first instance dismissed the case, noting that there was no ‘linear chain of 
causation’ between RWE’s emissions and Lliuya’s situation.164 The decision was appealed and 
is currently pending.  
Both the Kivalina and the Huaraz cases highlight one of the biggest obstacles for 
climate change litigation against private corporations, which is establishing a linear causal 
chain between the defendant’s GHGs emissions and the particular climate change impacts 
suffered by the plaintiff.165As a result of the outlined barriers, most of the cases against private 
corporations have been fruitless. Even if they failed to achieve the desired outcome, these cases 
garnered significant media attention. Such attention could cause damage to the credibility of 
the corporation and potentially lead to financial or reputational costs, which could in turn result 
in prevention measures and mitigation of emissions to avoid future allegations.166 
Subsequently, litigation could eventually have an indirect impact on the fight against climate 
change. While until now, the most effective path for controlling the actions of a private 
corporation, was to be found only through States’ responsibility to protect human rights,167 a 
recent court ruling presents a silver lining. 
 On 29 January 2021, in the case of Akpan v Royal Dutch Shell/Shell Nigeria, 168 Shell 
Nigeria was held responsible by the Dutch Court of Appeal for two oil spills in Niger Delta 
and was found liable to pay compensation. Royal Dutch Shell was found to have a duty of care 
to the villagers affected by the oil spill and together with Shell Nigeria will be held liable for 
any failure to prevent future oil spills.169 This judgement is momentous as it established for the 
first time that parent companies can be accountable for the malfeasance of their subsidiaries, 
shaping a positive direction on extraterritorial environmental corporate liability for future court 
rulings. This is also supported by the UK’s Supreme Court ruling on 12 February 2021, which 
allowed the case against Royal Dutch Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary to proceed before the 
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UK Courts.170 Outstandingly, the Court's judgement indicates that Shell is liable for the 
pollution distressing the Ogale and Bille communities. These latest decisions are extremely 
positive and could help overcome the aforementioned obstacles of extraterritoriality and linear 
causal link, as they allowed for plaintiffs to stand for present and future rights to a healthy 
environment before Courts of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
5. Conclusion 
The cases analysed demonstrate that human rights arguments are being used in an 
increasing number of climate change cases.171 As the consequences of environmental 
degradation become evident in many parts of the world, the concerns regarding the rights of 
future generations are progressively augmented. As the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCHR) stated.  
‘Climate change is a reality that now affects every region of the world. The 
human implications of currently projected levels of global heating are 
catastrophic. Storms are rising and tides could submerge entire island nations 
and coastal cities. Fires rage through our forests, and the ice is melting. We 
are burning up our future – literally.’172 
Brown Weiss stated years ago that climate change challenges the justice between the 
present and future generations.173 Now more than ever, human rights climate change litigation 
is focusing on intergenerational equity and portrays the legal content of the rights of future 
generations. Nevertheless, judicial decisions over the years show that the legal position of 
future generations remains unresolved. The questions that the great moral philosophers have 
posed regarding the representation of future generations, and their interests are not always 
answered through Courts’ rulings. The legal standing of future generations is often questioned 
and depends upon the establishment of a linear causal link between the victim, the 
environmental damage and the human act that caused it.174 However, as we can rely on the 
continued existence of essential needs for clean air, water, food, and a healthy environment,175 
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the fundamental interests of future generations are not questioned. Remarkably, many of the 
cases analysed expand the law through interpretation to include the notion of intergenerational 
equity. This allows the plaintiffs to stand for the rights and interests of future generations, even 
in cases where there is no present threat but a great likelihood of a severe threat in the future.176 
Fruitful or not, climate cases outlined in this paper have proved to be both a robust 
regulatory and enforcement tool when addressing intergenerational equity. Recent successful 
litigation, like the Urgenda case, provide an even greater impetus for future litigation. 
However, even unsuccessful cases could have indirect impacts and influence future decisions. 
For instance, in the Teitiota case, the statement that environmental degradation could lead to 
refugee law protection presents a glimmer of hope for future successes under different 
circumstances. A strong dissenting decision, or a potential precedent set for future cases, could 
eventually achieve intergenerational equity.177  
Nonetheless, climate change obligations are hard to apply against the most polluting 
actors, that is, private corporations. The human rights responsibilities of private entities are 
centred around the State, which ultimately is answerable for the violations caused due to GHG 
emissions by the corporations. Although internationally, there are no effectively binding 
human rights procedural mechanisms, domestically human rights obligations are enforceable. 
While until now it has proven difficult to prove a causal link and attribute delocalised GHG 
emissions to private corporations,178 the latest decisions regarding Royal Dutch Shell and Shell 
Nigeria mark a turning point in climate change litigation concerning human rights. Though 
effective, holding private corporations accountable through States’ responsibility for failing to 
prevent their emissions could be problematic due to extraterritoriality.179 The two above-
mentioned cases could present a light paradigm for subsequent rulings. Nonetheless, many 
hurdles need to be overcome, policy discretion being among them. 
On the whole/Overall, climate change litigation can be an effective remedy in the fight 
against climate change and in ensuring intergenerational equity, while filling the lacuna of a 
common legal framework establishing the rights of future generations. Climate litigation is 
positively increasing, and although the current Covid-19 crisis could delay or decrease new or 
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already filed claims,180 it could also motivate plaintiffs to find new grounds for bringing cases 
by connecting the current health emergency to the climate emergency.181 
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